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Abstract. We propose a formal approach for the detection of high-level
malware behaviors. Our technique uses a rewriting-based abstraction
mechanism, producing abstracted forms of program traces, independent
of the program implementation. It then allows us to handle similar be-
haviors in a generic way and thus to be robust with respect to variants.
These behaviors, defined as combinations of patterns given in a signa-
ture, are detected by model-checking on the high-level representation of
the program. We work on unbounded sets of traces, which makes our
technique useful not only for dynamic analysis, considering one trace at
a time, but also for static analysis, considering a set of traces inferred
from a control flow graph. Abstracting traces with rewriting systems on
first order terms with variables allows us in particular to model dataflow
and to detect information leak.
Keywords: Malware, behavioral detection, behavior abstraction, trace,
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1 Introduction
Behavior analysis was introduced by Cohen’s seminal work [11] to detect mal-
ware and in particular unknown malware. In general, a behavior is described by
a sequence of system calls and recognition uses the formalism of finite state au-
tomata [22, 26, 24, 6]. New approaches have been proposed recently. In [18, 27],
malicious behaviors are specified by temporal logic formulas with parameters
and detection is carried out by model-checking. However, these approaches are
tightly dependent on the way malicious actions are realized: using any other
system facility to realize an action allows a malware to go undetected. This has
motivated yet another approach where a malicious behavior is specified as a
combination of high-level actions, in order to be independent from the way these
actions are realized and to only consider their effect on a system. In [23] and
in [3], a captured execution trace is transformed into a higher-level represen-
tation capturing its semantic meaning, i.e., the trace is first abstracted before
being compared to a malicious behavior. In [17], the authors propose to use
attribute automata, at the price of an exponential time complexity detection.
These dynamic abstraction-based approaches, though they can detect unknown
viruses whose execution traces exhibit known malicious behaviors, only deal with
a single execution trace.
In this paper, we propose a formal approach for high-level behavior analysis,
with the following features. Underpinned by language theory, term rewriting and
first-order temporal logic, it allows us to determine whether a program exhibits
a high-level behavior. Detection is achieved in two steps. First, traces of the pro-
gram are abstracted in order to reveal the sequences of high-level functionalities
they realize. Then, abstracted traces are compared with the behavior formula,
using usual model-checking techniques. Functionalities have parameters repre-
senting the manipulated data, so our formalism is adapted to the protection
against generic threats like the leak of sensitive information.
Our goal here is not to provide a ready-made software to detect behaviors, but
to propose a formal framewok emphasizing fundamental detection mechanisms,
which are independent of implementation-based solutions.
Our approach has two main characteristics. First, we work on an unbounded
set of traces representing the behavior of a program, in order to consider a more
complete representation of the program than with a single trace. To deal with
the infinity of the set of traces, we restrict to regular sets and safely approximate
the set of abstract traces, so that we detect in linear time whether a program
exhibits a given behavior. Second, we work on abstract forms of traces, in or-
der to only keep the essence of the functions performed by the program, to be
independent of their possible implementations and to be generic with respect
to behavior mutations. Behavior components are abstracted in program traces,
by identifying known functionalities and marking them by inserting abstract
functionality symbols.
By working on sets of traces, which may consist of a single trace as well
as of an unbounded number of traces, our approach may be used not only for
classical, dynamic behavior analysis, but also for static behavior analysis i.e.,
behavior analysis in a static analysis setting.
Static behavior analysis by abstraction is more challenging than its dynamic
counterpart because, precisely, this approach needs to abstract a program behav-
ior potentially representing an infinite set of execution traces. The construction
of an exhaustive representation of a program behavior is an intractable prob-
lem in general: in particular, a program flow may not be easily followed due to
indirect jumps, and a program may use complex code protection, for instance
by dynamically modifying its code or by using obfuscation. Self modification is
usually tackled by emulating the program long enough to deactivate most code
protections. Indirect jumps and obfuscation are usually handled by abstract in-
terpretation [25, 19] or symbolic execution [7].
Static behavior analysis has many advantages and applications. First, it al-
lows us to analyze the behavior of a program in a more exhaustive way, as it
analyzes the unbounded set of the program execution traces, or an approxima-
tion of it. Second, static behavior analysis can complement classical, dynamic,
behavior analysis with an analysis of the future behavior, to prevent damages
when some critical point is reached in an execution.
An interesting application of static behavior analysis is the audit of pro-
grams in high-level technologies, like mobile applications, browser extensions,
web page scripts, .NET or Java programs. Auditing these programs is complex
and mostly manual, resulting in highly publicized infections [2, 1]. In this con-
text, static analysis can provide an appropriate help, because it is usually easier
than for usual programs, especially when additionally enforcing a security pol-
icy (e.g. prohibiting self-modification [28]) or when enforcing strict development
guidelines (e.g. for iPhone applications).
To our knowledge, the use of behavior abstraction on top of static behavior
analysis has not been investigated so far. As our detection mechanism relies on
satisfaction of temporal logic formulas, it is akin to model checking [21], for which
there already exist numerous frameworks and tools [16, 14, 8]. The specificity of
our approach, however, is that, rather than being applied on the set of program
traces, verification is applied on the set of abstract forms of these traces, which is
not computable in general. Accordingly, we identify a property of practical high-
level behaviors allowing us to approximate this set, in a sound and complete way
with respect to detection, and then to apply classical verification techniques.
Our abstraction framework can be used in two scenarios:
– Detection of given behaviors: signatures of given high-level behaviors are ex-
pressed in terms of abstract functionalities. Given some program, we then
assess whether one of its execution traces exhibits a sequence of known func-
tionalities, in a way specific to one of the given behaviors. This can be applied
to detection of suspicious behaviors. Although detection of such suspicious
behaviors may not suffice to label a program as malicious, it can be used to
supplement existing detection techniques with additional decision criteria.
– Analysis of programs: abstraction provides a simple and high-level represen-
tation of a program behavior, which is more suitable than the original traces
for manual analysis, or for analysis of behavior similarity with known be-
haviors, etc. For instance, it could be used to detect not necessarily harmful
behaviors, in order to get a basic understanding of the program and to fur-
ther investigate if deemed necessary. It could also be used to automatically
discover sequences of high-level functionalities and their dataflow dependen-
cies, exhibited by a program.
Previous work. In [4], we already proposed to abstract program sets of traces
with respect to behavior patterns, for detection and analysis. We tested our
approach on samples of malicious programs collected using a honeypot3 and
identified using Kaspersky Antivirus. These samples belonged to known malware
families, like Allaple, Virut, Agent, Rbot, Afcore and Mimail. Most of them were
successfully matched to our malware database.
3 The honeypot of the Loria’s High Security Lab: http://lhs.loria.fr
But patterns were defined by string rewriting systems, which did not allow
the actions composing a trace to have parameters, precluding dataflow analysis.
Moreover, abstraction rules replaced identified patterns by abstraction symbols
in the original trace, precluding a further detection of patterns interleaved with
the rewritten ones.
The formalism proposed in this paper addresses both issues: first, we handle
interleaved patterns by keeping the identified patterns when abstracting them.
Second, we extend the rewriting framework to express data constraints on action
parameters by using term rewriting systems. An important consequence is that,
unlike in [4], using the dataflow, we can detect information leaks in order to
prevent unauthorized disclosure or modifications of information.
2 Background
Term Algebras. Let S = {Trace,Action,Data} be a set of sorts, F = Ft ∪Fa
∪Fd be a finite S-sorted signature, where Ft, Fa, Fd are mutually distinct and:
– Ft = {ǫ, ·} is the set of the trace constructors, where ǫ :→ Trace denotes
the empty trace, . has profile Data Trace → Trace;
– Fa is a set of function symbols or constants, with profile Data
n → Action,
n ∈ N, describing actions;
– Fd is a set of data constructors, with profile → Data or Data
n → Data,
n ∈ N.
Let N∗+ be the set of finite strings of positive natural numbers, called positions.
The empty string is denoted by λ, and u ≤ v means that u is prefix of v. Let X
be a set of S-sorted variables. A S-sorted term over (F , X) is a partial function
t : N∗+ → F ∪ X, such that the domain of definition of t, denoted by Pos(t),
is finite and satisfies, for w ∈ N∗+ and i ∈ N: (1) wi ∈ Pos(t) ⇒ w ∈ Pos(t),
(2) w ∈ Pos(t) ⇒ t(w) ∈ F ∪ X. Pos(t) is called the set of positions of t. We
denote by T (F , X) (resp. T (F)) the set of S-sorted terms over (F , X) (resp. the
set of finite ground terms over F). For any sort s ∈ S, and any of the above sets
of terms T we denote by Ts the restriction of T to terms of sort s and by Xs
the subset of variables of X of sort s. For a term t with p ∈ Pos(t), we denote
by t|p the subterm of t at position p. We denote by t[t
′]p the term obtained by
replacing by t′ the subterm at position p in t. We use the abbreviated notation
x for variables x1, . . . , xn. So x ∈ X stands for x1, . . . , xn ∈ X, and if f ∈ F is
a symbol of arity n ∈ N, we denote by f (x) the term f (x1, . . . , xn).
The elements of TTrace(F) are called traces, the elements of TAction(F) are
called actions. We distinguish the sort Action from the sort Trace but, for a
sake of readability, we may denote by a the trace · (a, ǫ), for some action a.
Similarly, we use the · symbol with infix notation and right associativity, and
ǫ is understood when the context is unambiguous. For instance, if a, b, c are
actions, a · b · c denotes the trace · (a, · (b, · (c, ǫ))).
We partition Fa in a set Σ of symbols, denoting concrete program-level ac-
tions, and a set Γ , denoting abstract actions identifying abstracted functional-
ities. To construct purely concrete (resp. abstract) terms, we use FΣ = F \ Γ
(resp. FΓ = F \Σ). The projection t|Σ′ , also denoted πΣ′ (t), of a trace t on an
alphabet Σ′ ⊆ Fa corresponds to keeping in a trace only actions from Σ
′. If X is
a set of variables of sort Data, we define the projection on an alphabet Σ′ ⊆ Fa
of a term t ∈ TTrace (F, X), denoted by πΣ′ (t) or, equivalently, by t|Σ′ , in the
following way:
πΣ′ (ǫ) = ǫ
πΣ′ (b · u) =
{
b · πΣ′ (u) if b ∈ TAction (FΣ′ , X)
πΣ′ (u) otherwise
with b ∈ TAction (F, X) and u ∈ TTrace (F, X). The projection is naturally ex-
tended to sets of traces.
We define in a natural way the concatenation t · t′ of two traces t and t′. The
concatenation of two terms t and t′ of TTrace (F, X), where X is a set of S-sorted
variables and t 6∈ X, is denoted by t·t′ ∈ TTrace (F, X) and defined by t·t
′ = t [t′]p,
where p is the position of ǫ in t, i.e., t|p = ǫ. Projection and concatenation are
naturally extended to sets of terms of sort Trace. We also extend concatenation to
2TTrace(F,X)×2TTrace(F,X) with L ·L′ = {t · t′ | t ∈ L, t′ ∈ L′} and to 2TTrace(F,X)×
TAction (F, X) with L · a = L · {a · ǫ}.
Substitutions are defined as usual. A ground substitution on a finite set X
of S-sorted variables is a mapping σ : X → T (F) such that: ∀s ∈ S, ∀x ∈
Xs, σ (x) ∈ Ts (F). σ can be naturally extended to a mapping T (F , X) → T (F)
in such a way that:
∀f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T (F , X) ,
σ (f (t1, . . . , tn)) = f (σ (t1) , . . . , σ (tn)) .
By convention, we denote by tσ or by σ (t) the application of a substitution
σ to a term t ∈ T (F , X) and by Lσ the application of σ to a set of terms
L ⊆ T (F , X). The set of ground substitutions over X is denoted by SubstX.
Program Behavior. The representation of a program is chosen to be its set
of traces. When executing a program, the captured data is represented on the
alphabets Σ, denoting the concrete actions, and Fd, describing the data. In this
paper, we consider that the captured data is the library calls along with their
arguments. Σ therefore represents the finite set of library calls, while terms built
on Fd identify the arguments and the return values of these calls. A program
execution trace then consists of a sequence of library calls and is defined by
a term of TTrace (FΣ). A program behavior is defined by the set of its execu-
tion traces, that is a possibly infinite subset of TTrace (FΣ). For instance, the
term fopen (1, 2) · fwrite (1, 3) represents the execution trace of a file open call
fopen (1, 2) followed by a file write call fwrite (1, 3), where 1 ∈ Fd identifies
the file handle returned by fopen, 2 ∈ Fd identifies the file path and 3 ∈ Fd
identifies the written data.
First-Order Linear Temporal Logic (FOLTL). We consider the First-
Order Logic (FOLTL) defined in [21], without the equality predicate, where the
set of atomic predicates AP is a set of terms with variables in a set X. FOLTL
is an extension of the LTL Logic (see also [21]) such that:
– If ϕ is an LTL formula, then ϕ is an FOLTL formula;
– If ϕ is an FOLTL formula and Y ⊆ X is a set of variables, then: ∃Y.ϕ and
∀Y.ϕ are FOLTL formulas, where as usual: ∀Y.ϕ ≡ ¬∃Y.¬ϕ.
Notation ϕ1 ⊙ ϕ2 stands for ϕ1 ∧X (⊤Uϕ2).
We say that a FOLTL formula is closed when it has no free variable, i.e.,
every variable is bound by a quantifier.
Let Y ⊆ X be a set of variables of sort Data and σ ∈ SubstY be a ground
substitution over Y . The application of σ to an FOLTL formula ϕ is naturally
defined by the formula ϕσ where any free variable x in ϕ which is in Y has been
replaced by its value σ (x).
A formula ϕ is satisfied on infinite sequences of sets of ground instances of
atomic predicates, denoted by ξ = (ξ0, ξ1, . . .). ξ |= ϕ (ξ satisfies ϕ) is defined in
the same way as for the LTL logic, with the additional rule: ξ |= ∃Y.ϕ iff there
exists σ ∈ SubstY such that ξ |= ϕσ.
In our context, a formula is satisfied over traces of TTrace (F) identified with
sequences of singleton sets of atomic predicates. A finite trace t = a0 · · · an is
identified with the infinite sequence of sets of atomic predicates ξt = ({a0} , . . . ,
{an} , {} , {} , . . .), and t satisfies ϕ, denoted by t |= ϕ, iff ξt |= ϕ.
We consider two distinct instances of this logic, depending on the fact that we
consider concrete traces or abstract traces. We denote by FOLTLΣ the FOLTL
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Note that in practice, to express behaviors, we only use FOLTL formulas
that are negations of safety properties. We do not use properties with liveness
aspects, which would note make sense on finite traces. Using FOLTL on finite
traces allows us a correct balance between behavior expresivity and decidability.
Tree automata and tree transducers are defined as usual [12].
3 Behavior Patterns
The problem under study can be formalized in the following way. First, using
FOLTL formulas, we define a set of behavior patterns, where each pattern rep-
resents a (possibly infinite) set of terms from TTrace (FΣ). Second, we need to
define a terminating abstraction relation R allowing to schematize a trace by ab-
stracting occurrences of the behavior patterns in that trace. Finally, given some
program p coming with an infinite set of traces L (static analysis scenario, for
instance by using the control flow graph, see our previous work [4] and [10, 20]),
we formulate the detection problem in the following way. Let L↓R be the set of
normal forms of traces of L for R i.e., the set of abstracted traces of L, using
R. Given an abstract behavior M defined by an FOLTL formula ϕ, does there
exist a trace t in L↓R such that t |= ϕ? Our goal is then to find an effective and
efficient method solving this problem.
A behavior pattern describes a functionality we want to recognize in a pro-
gram trace, like writing to system files, sending a mail or pinging a remote host.
Such a functionality can be realized in different ways, depending on which system
calls, library calls or programming languages it uses.
We describe a functionality by an FOLTL formula, such that traces satisfying
this formula are traces carrying out the functionality.
Example 1. Let us consider the functionality of sending a ping. One way of real-
izing it consists in calling the socket function with the parameter IPPROTO ICMP
describing the network protocol and, then, calling the sendto function with the
parameter ICMP ECHOREQ describing the data to be sent. Between these two
calls, the socket should not be freed. This is described by the FOLTL formula:
ϕ1 = ∃x, y. socket (x, α) ∧ (¬closesocket (x) U sendto (x, β, y)), where the first
parameter of socket is the created socket and the second parameter is the network
protocol, the first parameter of sendto is the used socket, the second parame-
ter is the sent data and the third one is the target, the unique parameter of
closesocket is the freed socket and constants α and β in Fd identify the above
parameters IPPROTO ICMP and ICMP ECHOREQ.
A ping may also be realized using the function IcmpSendEcho, whose pa-
rameter represents the ping target. This corresponds to the FOLTL formula:
ϕ2 = ∃x. IcmpSendEcho (x).
Hence, the ping functionality may be described by the FOLTL formula:
ϕping = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2.
We then define a behavior pattern as the set of traces carrying out its func-
tionality i.e., satisfying the formula describing the functionality.
Definition 1. A behavior pattern is a set of traces B ⊆ TTrace (FΣ) satisfying
a closed FOLTLΣ formula ϕ: B = {t ∈ TTrace (FΣ) | t |= ϕ} .
4 Trace Abstraction
As said before, our goal is to be able to detect, in a given set of traces, some
predefined behavior composed of combinations of high-level functionalities. For
this, we associate to each behavior pattern an abstract symbol λ taken in the
alphabet Γ , called abstraction symbol. An abstract behavior is then defined by
combinations of abstraction symbols associated to behavior patterns, using an
FOLTL formula ϕ on APΓ = TAction (FΓ, X) instead of APΣ = TAction (FΣ, X).
Definition 2. An abstract behavior is a set of traces M ⊆ TTrace (FΓ) satisfying
a closed FOLTLΓ formula ϕM : M = {t ∈ TTrace (FΓ) | t |= ϕM} . When M is
defined by a formula ϕM , we write: M := ϕM .
Example 2. The abstract behavior of sending a ping to a remote host can then
be trivially defined by the formula: ϕM = ∃x.Fλping (x) .
In the following, for the sake of simplicity, the initial F operator is implicit
in definitions of abstract behaviors.
Now, let L be the set of program traces we want to analyze. To compare
these traces to the given abstract behavior, we have to consider the behavior
pattern occurrences they may contain, at the abstract level. For this, we define
an abstraction relation R, which marks such occurrences in traces by inserting
an abstraction symbol λB when an occurrence of the behavior pattern B is
identified.
From now on, if a behavior pattern is defined using an FOLTL formula ϕ
and associated to an abstraction symbol λ, we may denote it λ := ϕ.
The abstraction symbol can have parameters corresponding to those used
by the behavior pattern. This allows us to express dataflow constraints in a
signature. For instance, the abstraction symbol for the ping behavior pattern can
take a parameter denoting the ping target. A signature for a denial of service
could then be defined, for example, as a sequence of 100 pings with the same
target.
Example 3. The ping behavior pattern in Example 1 is abstracted in traces by in-
serting the λping symbol after the send action or after the IcmpSendEcho action.
Then, the trace socket(1, α) · gethostbyname(2) · sendto(1, β, 3) · closesocket(1)
can be abstracted into the trace socket(1, α) · gethostbyname(2) · sendto(1, β, 3) ·
λping(3) · closesocket(1).
Thus, abstraction of a trace reveals abstract behavior pattern combinations,
which may constitute the abstract behavior to be observed. We now formally
define the abstraction relation.
As said above, abstracting a trace with respect to some behavior pattern
amounts to transforming it when it contains an occurrence of the behavior pat-
tern, by inserting a symbol of Γ in the trace. This symbol is inserted at the po-
sition after which the behavior pattern functionality has been performed. This
position is the most logical one to stick to the trace semantics. Furthermore,
when behavior patterns appear interleaved, this position allows us to define the
order in which their functionalities are realized (see the full version of the paper
for an example [5]).
As said in the introduction, rather than replace behavior pattern occurrences
with abstraction symbols, we preserve them in order to properly handle inter-
leaved behavior patterns occurrences. Now, let us consider the following example.
Example 4. Abstraction of the ping in Example 3 is realized by rewriting us-
ing the rule A1(x, y) · B1(x, y) → A1(x, y) · λ(y) · B1(x, y), where A1(x, y) =
socket(x, α) · (TTrace (FΣ)\ (TTrace (FΣ) · closesocket(x) ·TTrace (FΣ))) ·sendto(x,
β, y) and B1(x, y) = {ǫ}, and the rule A2(x) ·B2(x) → A2(x) ·λ(x) ·B2(x), where
A2(x) = {IcmpSendEcho(x)} and B2(x) = {ǫ}.
As a behavior pattern is a set of possible traces realizing a given function-
ality, we define the abstraction relation by decomposing the behavior pattern
into a finite union of concatenations of sets Ai (X) and Bi (X) such that traces
in Ai (X) end with the action effectively performing the behavior pattern func-
tionality. These sets Ai (X) and Bi (X) are composed of concrete traces only,
since abstract actions that may appear in a partially rewritten trace should not
impact the abstraction of an occurrence of the behavior pattern.
Definition 3. Let λ ∈ Γ be an abstraction symbol, X be a set of variables of sort
Data, x be a sequence of variables in X. An abstraction system on TTrace (F, X)
is a finite set of rewrite rules of the form: Ai (X) ·Bi (X) → Ai (X) ·λ (x) ·Bi (X)
where the sets Ai (X) and Bi (X) are sets of concrete traces of TTrace (FΣ, X).
Dealing with sets as left(right)-hand sides of rules may seem to be heavy.
In fact, this allows us to recognize not only finitely enumerated patterns, but
patterns from languages i.e., patterns among possibly infinite sets of behaviors.
The system of rewrite rules we use generates a reduction relation on TTrace (F)
such that filtering works on traces projected on Σ.
Definition 4. The reduction relation on TTrace(F) generated by a system of n
rewrite rules Ai (X) · Bi (X) → Ai (X) · λ (x) · Bi (X) is the rewriting relation
→R such that, for all t, t
′ ∈ TTrace (F) , t →R t
′ iff:
∃σ ∈ SubstX, ∃p ∈ Pos(t), ∃i ∈ [1..n] ,
∃a ∈ TTrace (F) · TAction (FΣ) , ∃b, u ∈ TTrace(F),
a|Σ ∈ Ai (X)σ, b|Σ ∈ Bi (X)σ, t|p = a · b · u
and t′ = t [a · λ (x)σ · b · u]p .
An abstraction relation with respect to a given behavior pattern is thus the
reduction relation of an abstraction system, where left members of the rules
cover the set of the traces realizing the behavior pattern functionality.
Definition 5. Let B be a behavior pattern associated with an abstraction symbol
λ ∈ Γ . Let X be a set of variables of sort Data. An abstraction relation w.r.t.
this behavior pattern is the reduction relation on TTrace(FΣ) generated by an







(Ai (X) ·Bi (X))σ .
Finally, we generalize the definition of abstraction to a set of behavior patterns.
Definition 6. Let C be a finite set of behavior patterns. An abstraction relation
w.r.t C is the union of the abstraction relations w.r.t. the elements of C.
As we will see later, for R to be realizable by a tree transducer, the abstraction
relation R has to be terminating. However, even with a finite set of traces,
abstraction does not terminate in general, since the same occurrence of a pattern
can be abstracted an unbounded number of times. So we require that the same
abstract action is not inserted twice after the same concrete action. In other
words, if t = t1 ·t2 is abstracted into t
′ = t1 ·α·t2, where α is the inserted abstract
action, then if t2 starts with a sequence of abstract actions, α does not appear in
this sequence. Formally, we require that: ∀t1, t2 ∈ TTrace (F) , ∀α ∈ TAction (FΓ),
if t1 · t2 →R t1 · α · t2, then 6 ∃u ∈ TTrace (FΓ) , 6 ∃u
′ ∈ TTrace (F) , t2 = u · α · u
′.
Using the above condition, supposed to be verified from now on, a behavior
pattern occurrence can only be abstracted once. Furthermore, abstraction does
not create new abstraction opportunities so the relation R is clearly terminating.
Remark 1. A terminating abstraction relation with respect to a set of behavior
patterns is not confluent in general. We could adapt the definition of the abstrac-
tion relation to make it confluent, for instance by defining an order on the set
TAction (FΓ). However, as already mentioned, detection works on normal forms.
So having several normal forms for a trace does not compromise its mechanism.
In practice, a behavior pattern is regular, along with the set of instances
of right-hand sides of its abstraction rules. We show that this is sufficient, with
termination of the set of rules, to ensure that the abstraction relation is realizable
by a tree transducer, in other words that it is a rational tree transduction. The
tree transducer formalism is chosen for its interesting formal (closure by union,
composition, preservation of regularity) and computational properties. When
TAction(F) is finite, we can state the following result.
Theorem 1. Let B be a behavior pattern and R be a terminating abstraction
relation w.r.t. B defined by an abstraction system whose set of instances of right-
hand sides of rules is recognized by a tree automaton AR. Then R and R
−1 are
rational and, for any tree automaton A recognizing a trace language L, R(L) is
recognized by a tree automaton of size O (|A| · |AR|).
5 Detection Problem
Then the detection problem can be formalizeded as follows.
Definition 7. A set of traces L ⊆ TTrace(FΣ) exhibits an abstract behavior M
defined by a formula ϕM , denoted by L ⋓M , iff: ∃t ∈ L↓R|Γ , t |= ϕM .
When L is restricted to a single trace, or to a finite set of traces, like in
dynamic analysis, the set L↓R of normal forms of traces i.e., the set of traces
that cannot be rewritten anymore with R, is computable since the rewrite system
R is terminating. Moreover, as FOLTL quantification is performed over variables
in the domain TData(F), FOLTL verification is decidable when TData(F) is finite.
So in this case, it can be decided whether L exhibits M .
For an infinite set of finite traces L however, the computation of L↓R often
relies on the computation of the set of descendants R∗(L) of L i.e., the set of
all terms that can be rewritten from terms of L. But R∗(L) is computable only
for some classes of rewrite systems [15] and when L is regular. Unfortunately,
the rewrite systems which implement the abstraction relations and which are
described in Sect. 4 do not belong to any of these classes. Hence, we cannot rely
on the construction of L↓R to decide whether L exhibits M .
Nevertheless, we will see that, for behaviors considered in practice, a partial
abstraction of the set of traces is sufficient i.e., computing the set of normal
forms is unnecessary. We therefore propose a detection algorithm relying on a
safe approximation of the set of abstract traces. This approximation must be
chosen carefully. For instance, it cannot consist in computing, for some n, the
set R≤n(L) of descendants of L until order n, as shown by the following example.
Example 5. Let λ1 := a, λ2 := b, λ3 := c be three behavior patterns associ-
ated to abstraction relations inserting the abstraction symbol after a, b and c
respectively. Let M := λ1 ∧ (¬λ2 Uλ3) be an abstract behavior. Assume there
exists a bound n such that L↓R may be approximated by R
≤n(L) in Definition
7. The trace t = an−1 · b · c · d does not exhibit the behavior M . Yet the trace
t′ = (a · λ1)
n−1 · b · c · λ3 · d is in R
≤n({t}) and its projection on Γ is in M , so
we would wrongly infer that t exhibits M .
The problem comes from the fact that R≤n(L) contains contradictory traces
compromising detection i.e., traces seemingly exhibiting an abstract behavior
though a few additional abstraction steps would make them leave the signature.
Consequently, we want to exclude traces unreliably realizing the abstract
behavior inR≤n(L), while not having to reach normal forms. In fact, we identify a
fundamental property we call (m,n)-completeness, verified by abstract behaviors
in practice in the field of malware detection. This property states that, for a
program to exhibit an abstract behavior, a necessary and sufficient condition is
the following: there exists a partially abstracted trace, abstracted in at most m
abstraction steps, realizing the behavior and whose descendants until the order
n still realize it.
Definition 8. Let M be an abstract behavior defined by a formula ϕM and m
and n be positive numbers. M has the property of (m,n)-completeness iff for
any set of traces L ⊆ TTrace(FΣ):




, t′′ |= ϕM .
We then show in the next section that, when L is regular, there exists a
sound and complete detection procedure for every abstract behavior enjoying this
property. Moreover, the time and space complexity of this detection procedure
is linear in the size of the representation of L.
The following propositions show that the (m,n)-completeness property is
realistic for abstract behaviors considered in practice.
We first prove, for particular abstract behaviors describing sequences of ab-
stract actions with no constraints other than dataflow constraints, that we have
the property of (m,n)-completeness.
Proposition 1. Let Y be a set of variables of sort Data.
Let α1, . . . , αm ∈ TAction (FΓ, Y ). Then the abstract behavior M := ∃Y. α1⊙α2⊙
. . .⊙ αm has the property of (m, 0)-completeness.
Proofs of propositions and theorems can be found in [5].
We now show that more complex abstract behaviors, forbidding specific ab-
stract actions, have this property.
For a behavior pattern λ, let Rλ denote the restriction of the abstraction
relation R to abstraction with respect to λ. We say that two behavior patterns
λ and λ′ are independent iff: Rλ ◦ Rλ′ = Rλ′ ◦ Rλ. Then we get the following
result.
Proposition 2. Let M := ∃Y. λ1(x1) ∧ ¬(∃Z. λ2(x2)) Uλ3(x3) be an abstract
behavior where Y and Z are two disjoint sets of variables of sort Data, x1, x3 ∈
Y , x2 ∈ Z, and where λ2 6= λ1, λ2 6= λ3 and λ2 is independent from λ3. Then
M has the property of (2, 1)-completeness.
In practice, as illustrated in Sect. 7, most signatures are disjunctions of for-
mulas of the form: ∃Y. α1 ⊙ α2 ⊙ . . .⊙ αm, from Proposition 1, or of the form:
∃Y.λ1 (x1) ∧ ¬ (∃Z1. λ (z1)) Uλ2 (x2) ∧ ¬ (∃Z2. λ (z2)) U . . . λk (xk)
where λ is independent from λ2, . . . , λk. From the proof of Proposition 2, we
conjecture that the last formula has the property of (k, 1)-completeness.
The independence condition is not necessary in general, in order to guarantee
that such abstract behaviors have a property of (m,n)-completeness for some m
and n, but absence of this condition results in significantly higher values of m
and n.
Fundamentally, by Definition 7, detection of an abstract behavior is decom-
posed into two independent steps: an abstraction step followed by a verification
step. The first step computes the abstract forms of the program traces while
the second step applies usual verification techniques in order to decide whether
one of the computed traces verifies the FOLTL formula defining the abstract be-
havior. However, when using the (m,n)-completeness property to bypass the
general intractability of the abstraction step, this relies on computing a set
{
t ∈ TTrace (F) , R
≤n(t) |= ϕM
}
and then intersecting it with R≤m(L). So we
lose the previous decomposition, thereby preventing us from leveraging power-
ful techniques from the model checking theory. We therefore show that, in the
previous proposition, (m,n)-completeness allows us to nonetheless preserve that
decomposition, so that the abstraction step now becomes decidable.
Theorem 2. Let M be an abstract behavior defined by a formula ϕM = ∃Y.
λ1(x1) ∧ ¬(∃Z. λ2(x2))Uλ3(x3) where Y and Z are disjoint sets of variables
of sort Data, x1, x3 ∈ Y , x2 ∈ Z, and where λ2 6= λ1, λ2 6= λ3 and λ2 is








, t |= ϕM .
When both the abstraction relation R and the relation Rλ2

y are rational, the
set Rλ2

y (R≤2(L)) is computable and regular, and detection then boils down to
a classical model checking problem. In the general case, Rλ2

y is not rational, but
in our experimentations, the behavior pattern λ2 is defined by sets Ai and Bi
where Ai contains traces made of a single action and Bi = {ǫ}. Thus constructing
a transducer realizing the relation Rλ2

y is straightforward.
Remark 2. An equivalent definition of infection could consist in compiling the





exhibiting M . Then a set of traces L would exhibit M iff one of its traces is
in this set. This definition seems more intuitive: rather than abstracting a trace
and comparing it to an abstract behavior, we check whether this trace is an
implementation of the behavior. However, this approach would require to first




, which is not
generally computable and whose representation can quickly have a prohibitive
complexity stemming from the interleaving of behavior patterns occurrences (es-
pecially when traces realizing the behavior patterns are complex) and from the
variable instantiations.
6 Detection Complexity
The detection problem, like the more general problem of program analysis, re-
quires computing a partial abstraction of the set of analyzed traces. In practice,
in order to manipulate this set, we consider a regular approximation of it i.e., a
tree automaton. Moreover, in practice, as seen in Sect. 4, the abstraction relation
is rational, which entails the decidability of detection.
Theorem 3. Let R be an abstraction relation, such that R and R−1 are rational.
There exists a detection procedure deciding whether L exhibits M , for any regular
set of traces L ⊆ TTrace(FΣ) and for any regular abstract behavior M having the
property of (m,n)-completeness for some positive integers m and n.
Definition 9. Let M be an abstract behavior having the property of (m,n)-
completeness. The set of traces n-reliably realizing M w.r.t an abstraction rela-
tion R is the set {t ∈ TTrace (F) | ∀t




, t′ |= ϕM}.
Using the set of traces n-reliably realizingM , when TAction(F) is finite, we get
the following detection complexity, which is linear in the size of the automaton
recognizing the program set of traces, a major improvement on the exponential
complexity bound of [17].
Theorem 4. Let R be an abstraction relation such that R and R−1 are ra-
tional. Let τ be a tree transducer realizing R. Let M be a regular abstract be-
havior with the property of (m,n)-completeness and AM be a tree automaton
recognizing the set of traces n-reliably realizing M w.r.t. R. Deciding whether





× |A| × |AM |
)
time and space.
7 Information Leak Behaviors
Abstraction can be applied to detection of generic threats, and in particular to
detection of sensitive information leak. Such a leak can be decomposed into two
steps: capturing sensitive information and sending this information to an exoge-
nous location. The captured data can be keystrokes, passwords or data read from
a sensitive network location, while the exogenous location can be the network, a
removable device, etc. Thus, we define a behavior pattern λsteal (x), representing
the capture of some sensitive data x, and a behavior pattern λleak (x), represent-
ing the transmission of x to an exogenous location. Moreover, since the captured
data must not be invalidated before being leaked, we define a behavior pattern
λinval (x), which represents such an invalidation.
Finally, the captured data is usually not leaked in its raw form, so we take
into account transformations of this data via the behavior pattern λdepends (x, y)
which denotes a dependency of x on y. For instance, x may be a string repre-
sentation of y, or x may be an encryption or an encoding of y.
Then, in order to account for one such transformation of the stolen data, we
define the information leak abstract behavior:
M := ∃x, y. λsteal (x) ∧ ¬λinval (x) Uλdepends (y, x) ∧Uλleak (y) .
We consider the following definitions of the four behavior patterns involved,
after looking at several malware samples, like keyloggers, sms message leaking
applications or personal information stealing mobile applications:
– keystroke capture functionality:
λsteal(x) := GetAsyncKeyState(x)∨
(RegisterDev(KBD, SINK)⊙GetInputData(x, INPUT))
∨(∃y. SetWindowsHookEx(y, WH KEYBOARD LL)∧
¬UnhookWindowsHookEx(y)UHookCalled(y, x))
∨∃y.TelephonyManager getDeviceId(x, y)
– network send functionality:
λleak(x) := ∃y, z. sendto(z, x, y) ∨ ∃y, z. (connect (z, y) ∧ ¬close(z)
U send(z, x)) ∨ ∃c, s.HttpURLConnection getOutputStream(s, c)∧
¬OutputStream close(s)UOutputStream write(s, x)
– overwriting or freeing:
λinval(x) := free(x) ∨ ∃y. sprintf0(x, y) ∨GetInputData(x, INPUT) ∨ . . .
– dependences:
λdepends(x, y) := sprintf0(x, y) ∨ ∃s. sprintf1(x, s, y)
∨∃sb. StringBuilder append(sb, y)⊙ SB toString(x, sb) .
8 Experiments
Our goal is to detect the information leak behavior M defined in the previous
section. In order to perform behavior pattern abstraction and behavior detec-
tion in the presence of data, we use the CADP toolbox [14], which allows us
to manipulate and model-check communicating processes written in the LO-
TOS language. CADP features a verification tool, which allows on-the-fly model
checking of formulas expressed in the MCL language, a fragment of the modal
mu-calculus extended with data variables, whose FOLTL logic used in this paper
is a subset.
We first represent the program set of traces as a CADP process, using a
program control flow graph obtained by static analysis (see [4] and [10, 20]).
Regularity of the set of traces is enforced by limiting recursion and inlining
function calls, an approximation that can be deemed safe with respect to the
abstract behaviors to detect. Note that there are two shortcomings to regular
approximation. First, approximation of conditional branches by nondetermin-
istic branches may result in false positives, especially when the program code
is obfuscated. And second, failure to identify data correlations during dataflow
analysis can result in false negatives. However, this does not significantly impact
our detection results.
Now, as expressed in Theorem 2, detection of the information leak abstract







and then verifying whether an abstracted trace
matches the abstract behavior formula.
So, we can simulate the abstraction step in CADP and delegate the verifi-
cation step to the evaluator4 module. For this, we represent the set of traces L
of a given program by a system of communicating processes expressed in LO-
TOS, with a particular gate on which communications correspond to library
calls. Then, computation of R≤2(L) is performed by synchronization with an-
other LOTOS process which simulates the transducer realizing the abstraction.
Moreover, the relation Rλinval

y is rational and can also be simulated by process
synchronization in CADP.
For each malware sample we tested, we successfully ran evaluator4 on the
resulting process representing Rλinval

y (R≤2(L)), in order to detect the informa-
tion leak abstract behavior defined in the previous section.
We essentially applied our approach to two case studies. The first one comes
from a study on the detection rate of keylogger programs by existing antivirus [13],
which shows a high failure rate. For an example of a typical keylogger for test,
see [5]. From different keyloggers written in C for Windows, we constructed ab-
stract behaviors of keylogger features. Then, tests we ran on keyloggers to know
whether we are able to detect information leaking were successful.
Another exemple comes from an Android application for cell-phone named
SMS_Replicator_Secret, which forwards received SMS to the attacker. This
application defines a class SMSReceiver with a particular method OnReceive
(Context context, Intent intent). It then requests Android systems through
its file metadata, to execute OnReceive on each SMS received or sent. We ex-
tracted from this application abstract behaviors corresponding to SMS leaks.
Unlike the previous case study, we ran partial tests because of the difficulty to
set up an Android platform. They were successful.
9 Conclusion
We presented an original approach for detecting high-level behaviors in pro-
grams, describing combinations of functionalities and defined by first-order tem-
poral logic formulas. Behavior patterns, expressing concrete realizations of func-
tionalities, are also defined by first-order temporal logic formulas. Abstraction of
these functionalities in program traces is performed by term rewriting. Validation
of the abstracted traces with respect to some high-level behavior is performed via
usual model checking techniques. In order to address the general intractability
of the problem of constructing the normal form trace set for a given program, we
have identified a property of practical high-level behaviors allowing us to avoid
computing normal forms and yielding a linear time detection algorithm.
Abstraction is a key notion of our approach. Providing an abstracted form
for program traces and behaviors allows us to be independent of the program
implementation and to handle similar behaviors in a generic way, making this
framework robust with respect to variants. The fact that high-level behaviors
are combinations of elementary patterns enables us to efficiently summarize and
compact the possible combinations likely to compose suspicious behaviors. More-
over, high-level behaviors and behavior patterns are easy to update since they
are expressed in terms of basic blocks.
Our approach is at an early stage. We think that the theoretical results on
behavioral analysis presented here are promising. Applicability of our detection
technique could be further enhanced by automating construction of reference
behavior patterns, for example using mining techniques as in [9].
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[15] Rémi Gilleron and Sophie Tison. Regular Tree Languages and Rewrite Systems.
Fundamenta Informaticae, 24:157–176, 1995.
[16] Gerard J. Holzmann. The SPIN Model Checker: Primer and Reference Manual.
Addison-Wesley Professional, 2003.
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